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INTRODUCTION: LEGISLATIVE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL 
NONSCIENCE 
Samuel D. Estep* 
This symposium deals with the legal issues, or rather some of 
them, that are created by scientific research. Anyone remotely 
interested in scientific developments should be aware that even 
the existence of "new" scientific "facts," let alone the applica-
tion of such discoveries to everyday activities, gives rise to a host 
of human value judgments that should be faced and resolved by 
society. Although these problems are often left in purgatory for-
ever, it is the legal system, broadly defined, that attempts to re-
solve the conflict of interests (or the balancing of values) when a 
decision is made. Making this type of "balancing of values" 
judgments is the overriding-or perhaps even sole-function of 
the legal systeni. This is true whether we act through adminis-
trative regulations, legislative enactments, or judicial decisions. 
Many who are not part of the legal system-including a great 
many engaged in scientific research-are skeptical of the ability 
of, if not outright antagonistic towards, those in the legal system 
who make these judgments. Nevertheless, we know that 
throughout recorded history, human societies have used legal 
systems to regulate members' actions. Therefore, whether scien-
tists like it or not, lawyers will intrude on their work because 
there will be different views as to whether and how to use new 
technologies. 
The geometric growth in the rate of scientific discoveries just 
since the halfway mark in this century is staggering. Undoubt-
edly, this explains some of the antagonism between the public 
and scientists. A lack of understanding about the nature and the 
very process of scientific research causes some people to auto-
matically and often irrationally fear scientific advances, not dis-
similar to the fear of witch doctors and voodoo. On the other 
side, some scientists have a paranoid fear of interference from 
nonscientists. Antagonism arises because neither the scientific 
nor the legal community has tried hard enough to understand 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., 1940, Kansas State 
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what the other is saying or doing. Among other things, this 
would require lawyers to learn a new "language," a task many 
are not willing to accept. It is time that both sides realize that 
finger-pointing and name-calling do not solve the difficulty; they 
only exacerbate it. 
I feel very strongly that regulation of science should always be 
imposed only after thorough consultation with scientists and 
that scientists must be willing to describe all possible conse-
quences, good and bad, that might flow from some new scientific 
discovery. This Symposium's audience, however; consists of law-
yers and those who work with them. These individuals formulate 
and impose regulations on how new information will be used and 
some of them would prevent even the search itself in certain ar-
eas. Some of the authors in this Symposium point out just how 
badly the legal system handles particular science problems and 
make some suggestions that might improve existing solutions. I 
will raise some questions and make some comments about these 
Articles. In addition, however, I will point out how far off base 
the judiciary-just one part of our legal system-often gets as 
revealed in cases involving science and law. 
My suggestions will emphasize legal system mistakes. Al-
though scientists have made equally egregious mistakes, I am 
addressing my remarks to those who create and run the legal 
system. Actually the blame is not just that of scientists and the 
judiciary, or even of the entire legal system, because other 
groups are equally responsible for misunderstandings and hence 
mistakes. Third parties, such as the news media, are responsible 
for much of the misunderstandings that arise between scientists 
and the legal system people, particularly in a representative 
democracy.1 
In general, those in the legal system not only have not been 
trained in scientific research, but also have not been sensitized 
enough to recognize potential problems raised by new scientific 
developments. Law schools have made some beginnings, through 
seminars on science and law or on certain specific subject mat-
ters. Some mainstream courses, for example, environmental law 
and medicine and law, provide the typical law student with ex-
posure to scientific issues. In addition, good law teachers manage 
1. Unfortunately, the media suffer from the same malady that afflicts lawyers, legisla-
tors, and government administrators-deadlines, competition for attention and advance-
ment, lack of knowledge, too many subject matters needing attention, too little time and 
energy, and no training sufficient to even recognize potential problems of conflicting val-
ues, not to mention biases and prejudices which all of us have to some degree and of 
which often we are not even aware. 
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to bring some scientific materials in other courses to the atten- · 
tion of their students. Nevertheless, most law students graduate 
without a sufficient understanding of the legal ramifications of 
scientific research. For lawyers who graduated more than ten or 
fifteen years ago, even this limited knowledge does not exist, un-
less they have handled a detailed case in a scientific area. Even 
that sensitizing experience would not carry over to other science 
areas. 
Commentators have pointed out how badly the legal system 
handles scientific material when science specialists engage in 
"battles of experts" during a trial.2 Too often the results resem-
ble those reached during the gun fight at the "OK Corral"- the 
one with the slickest or fastest moves wins. Another way of put-
ting it is to describe the results as similar to a lottery draw-
ing-winning is dependent on pure chance, not rational sense. 3 
The best that can be said for the legal conclusion in most cases 
is that a definite answer has been reached, not that the result is 
scientifically valid. The field of tort law is "ripe" with such 
cases. With our flexible definition of expert, one can almost al-
ways be found to support any theory. As a result, a jury made up 
of nonexperts reaches a definite conclusion to a question that a 
group of respectable scientific experts would say cannot be an-
swered definitely. A group of the uninformed give a definite an-
swer the informed would never reach! This is not the occasion to 
rehash this thorny problem and its possible solutions, but it is 
another example of the difficulties lawyers face when trying to 
assimilate scientific material into the value-judgment environ-
ment of the legal system. This problem is an example of legal 
nonsense. Reaching a result is not good enough. It should also 
make scientific sense. 
The Symposium's authors are among those who have been 
concerned with these science and law matters and the Articles 
not only show the authors' own interests in a particular problem 
but also are contributing, although often only indirectly, to the 
education of legal system personnel in this type of analysis. We 
must strive constantly toward the impossible dream of making 
all lawyers and legislators aware of new scientific information 
and the potential value-balancing issues that are raised. As law-
yer-citizens, we have a primary responsibility in these matters. 
2. Some of the literature is listed in Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the 
Limits of Judicial Competence, 214 SCIENCE 1211, 1215 (1981). 
3. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to 
Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 273, 280 (1960). 
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We must find the "facts" by properly using scientific materials 
and then put faceup on the table the human values involved and 
reasons for reaching the balancing judgment we implement. 
Gore: Biotechnology Policy 
Senator Gore correctly emphasizes the role that public percep-
tion and political leadership play in the process by which expen-
sive research is funded and application of new scientific knowl-
edge is regulated. As indicated above, I quite agree that 
scientists must be willing to explain scientific advances in terms 
that the public will understand. Actually, there are numerous 
examples of scientists taking an active role in public debate 
about the use of scientific discoveries and technologies, particu-
larly since World War II. I do not think Senator Gore is correct, 
however, when he suggests that scientists have the primary re-
sponsibility in this informing function.• Persons in the legal sys-
tem-legislators, administrators, and lawyers-should encourage 
the scientific community to inform the public about advances in 
knowledge, including the potential good and bad consequences, 
but should themselves take the "point" position in such confron-
tations. Actually, Senator Gore was doing just that when he 
chaired the House hearings in 1982 concerning human genetic 
engineering.11 
The Senator's citing of the early development of nuclear tech-
nology as an example of failure to develop a "keener apprecia-
tion" of adverse consequences demonstrates a dangerous ten-
dency we all have to think hindsight's 20/20 vision could have 
been foresight if we were just conscientious.6 In the first place, I 
am not convinced that hindsight is really all that good. In any 
event, we seldom apply the lessons of history. More important, 
however, is the fallacy that diligence will allow us to foresee 
problems that will arise and will enable us to prevent any disas-
ters. This view is based on a misunderstanding of the very na-
ture of scientific research. By definition research is an endeavor 
to find the unknown! We cannot expect scientists to tell us what 
they do not know. It is up to the administrator, the legislator, 
4. Gore, Federal Biotechnology Policy: The Perils of Progress and the Risks of Un-
certainty, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 965, 966 (1987). 
5. Human Genetic Engineering Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations 
and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). 
6. Gore, supra note 4, at 967. 
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and the lawyer-citizen to elicit the scientific uncertainties and 
then weigh the risks of not reaping the benefits of a new discov-
ery against the potential suffering from only dimly understood 
hazards. 
The development of genetic engineering, the subject matter of 
Senator Gore's Article, is another classic example of what can 
happen if the Luddites become vociferous enough and sell the 
public on the voodoo image. If DNA research had been halted a 
decade ago, we would not have a relatively cheap source of insu-
lin and we would have stopped the promising research that is 
leading us to a better understanding of the human cell, and 
hence of the human organism. I am not suggesting that scien-
tists should be permitted to make the final decision as to how, if 
at all, scientific developments should be used. I am imploring 
the people who administer the legal system to take the primary 
responsibility for opening up the dialogue with the scientists, ac-
quiring a knowledge of how the scientific community works, and 
making the human values judgments that will control how scien-
tific knowledge will be pursued and used. We must lead the pub-
lic in gaining understanding, not let the doomsayers or ardent 
promoters win by the sheer volume (in both senses of the word) 
of chanted cliches. 
Another pitfall that those who make policy for the legal sys-
tem frequently do not avoid is to assume the answer before they 
have informed themselves about both the scientific "facts" and 
the validity of assumed value judgments. The assumption, for 
example, that nobody wants the power "to tamper with the ge-
netic makeup of a generation yet unborn"7 sounds very persua-
sive until we think about what we already do routinely, and 
without ethical qualms. We should ask ourselves just why we 
should draw a line and, if so, where. When we prolong the life of 
a small child by medical intervention, such as by drugs or surgi-
cal procedures, we are altering the genetic makeup of the next 
and later generations. The medical intervention that saved the 
child in effect preserved for the genetic pool a potential parent 
who Nature was going to eliminate. It is extremely difficult to 
draw a line between curing an illness and making a stronger, 
faster, or more intelligent individual. When we transplant body 
parts, at least in some cases, the next generation is affected. I 
am not saying that we should automatically accept all genetic 
engineering. Rather I am asking that we honestly identify the 
human values involved and make a conscious decision based on 
7. Id. at 967. 
948 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:4 
an intelligent, not just some emotional and often unstated, 
rationale. 8 
The interesting suggestions that Senator Gore makes with re-
gard to what might be done by way of regulating the biotechnol-
ogy industry to protect the public and preserve the world com-
petitive position of this business9 makes it clear that he is aware 
of the overall problem of balancing human values. It is crucial 
that any regulatory authority not only understand the science of 
biotechnology but also identify the human values potentially af-
fected and state clearly the rationale for tilting the scale one way 
or another. 
Adelman: Patents and the Courts 
Professor Adelman's Article deals with patent law, a subject of 
great interest to the business community but, until recently, 
badly neglected by law schools. At the outset, I remind the 
reader to pay careful attention to the footnotes, because they 
discuss some of the most important basic policy considerations. 
By actual count of the typed manuscript, there are more pages 
of footnotes than of text. I too am an academic person trained to 
be impressed with footnotes, but I consider this to be a sin, al-
beit a minor one. Just do not let the nuisance effect of skipping 
frequently to the bottom of the page cause you to miss the much 
more important analysis and statement of value positions. 
Adelman's exposition of the formation of a special court to 
handle all patent appeals is succinct yet enlightening. Because 
he uses it only as an introduction to his analysis of how that 
special court has handled patent matters, he does not consider 
8. Senator Gore presents another example where a conscious and rational decision 
should be made. The Senator's concern about overproduction of farm products and the 
possible demise of the small, family farmer is certainly realistic. I would suggest, how-
ever, that the main production problem is one of a different economic nature, i.e., the 
economics of distribution of food to a world with millions of starving people. I have no 
easy answer as to how to redistribute food resources, but I think before we cut back 
production any more we at least should ask the question if that is the best decision in 
the long run, taking full account of the world situation. The legal system first should ask 
the right policy questions. Likewise, establishing the sociological goal of maintaining the 
small, family farm unit should only be agreed on after we have asked what is the cause 
and what the effect, what are the economic consequences, how many people are involved, 
and what are the relative merits of the possibly conflicting human values. I am not dis-
agreeing with the conclusion reached nor am I approving it; I am asking only that we 
first ask what human values are being balanced and why we want the judgment to be one 
way or another. 
9. Gore, supra note 4, at 976. 
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the basic issue of whether or not special courts are better for 
some legal subject matters than courts of general appeal such as 
the United States Supreme Court. Adelman does make it clear 
that as a patent lawyer he thinks the Supreme Court made a 
mess of patent law. 
His position, of course, rests on a basic assumption that strong 
patent protection is vital for adequate economic growth in a cap-
italistic country. His support of the special judicial appeal pro-
cess, therefore, is result oriented. The Court is good or bad, de-
pending on whether or not it upholds patent rights, not 
depending on some strong philosophical or jurisprudential justi-
fication. We must evaluate this experience to determine if spe-
cial courts should be utilized for other areas involving an under-
standing of complicated concepts. 
The next question surely should be whether or not only espe-
cially knowledgeable people, with at least some significant train-
ing in science, should be appointed to such tribunals. Assuming 
that Woodward and Armstrong actually know and reported fully 
and accurately in their book, The Brethren, what was said and 
thought within the Supreme Court chambers and hallways-a 
rather large leap of faith-the material in footnote 24 gives some 
support for the argument that members of the judiciary should 
have a more sophisticated knowledge of scientific matters. 10 
Footnote 45 does touch on this problem and indicates some Con-
gressional concern about appointing specialists.11 
Beginning a fifth of the way through the Article, Professor 
Adelman deals with the patent questions that have come before 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and evaluates how 
that court has handled them. Such questions as "nonobvious-
ness," "infringement," "inequitable conduct," and "patent mis-
use" are described and critiqued. Adelman finds that in general 
the court is doing a good job and becoming quite knowledgeable 
in the technology of patent law. The patent practitioner clearly 
will be helped by this analysis. By observing the experience of 
this one special court in handling technology matters, however, 
we may learn something of real value for addressing the basic 
question of how the legal system generally should handle scien-
tific and technological questions that arise with increasing fre-
quency in litigation. 
10. Adelman, The New World of Patents Treated by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 979, 985-86 n.24 (1987). 
11. Id. at 991 n.45. 
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The suggestion at the end of Adelman's Article concerning the 
possible bypassing of juries in patent cases, perhaps even repeal-
ing the seventh amendment, raises a fascinating constitutional 
question. The author does not address whether' or not there is a 
special reason for removing the jury from patent cases but not 
from other cases involving at least equally difficult science mate-
rial. Certainly I have serious doubts about the usefulness, effi-
ciency, and even fairness of the use of juries in civil cases in the 
federal courts, but at first blush I see no acceptable rationale for 
giving special treatment to patent issues. 
Green: Scientific Responsibility 
Professor Green discusses the problem of what should be done 
about allegations of fraud in conducting scientific research and 
publishing the results of such research. This is a type of ques-
tion that directly raises the concerns and values which are at the 
core of the legal system, i.e., how to deal with allegations of 
wrongdoing by some member of a community. In this case, 
scientists, such as medical doctors, make up the relevant com-
munity, and then the community may be broadened to include 
those who give institutional or financial support. Ultimately, the 
community can be expanded to include the government, acting 
through the financial grant agencies or, if the rights of the par-
ties involved are litigated, through the judicial system. This is 
exactly the kind of situation, where scientists and members of 
the legal community clash and begin finger-pointing and name-
calling. 
Green presents a situation in which this problem arises and 
the difficulties that face those dealing with this type of allega-
tion well. He then suggests that the legal system could make a 
real contribution towards handling these cases of alleged scien-
tific fraud. Reprehensible as such fraud is, and perhaps even 
dangerous sometimes, I am not convinced that a case has been 
made for intervention by the legal profession to any greater de-
gree than now occurs in the form of hearings by granting agen-
cies and occasional litigation, such as libel actions by the ac-
cused. Green does not explain how the general public has been 
so seriously damaged that the almost always cumbersome and 
expensive (in time as well as money) legal process should be 
brought to bear whenever such an allegation is made. The ex-
pense of such action is well demonstrated by Professor Green's 
involvement in one case for over five years. 
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One specific suggestion made in the Article would make for a 
very interesting variation from the normal legal proceedings. 
Before giving the accuser something of the role of prosecutor in 
addition to that of witness in whistle-blower cases,12 we should 
consider why this is more appropriate in cases of scientific fraud 
than for normal criminal trials. The close relatives of a murder 
victim surely have just as much at stake in getting a conviction 
as does one who alleges scientific fraud. A sufficient case has not 
been made yet to convince me that giving the accuser the role of 
the prosecutor is justified. 
Several other questions are raised by Green's comments. Do 
we really want to adopt as the definition of scientific fraud that 
terribly vague "I know it when I see it even if I cannot define 
it"13 standard that has proved so impossibly slippery in the law 
of obscenity? How and why did Professor Jacobstein obtain pos-
session of the documents produced in the research of a col-
league? Why is it "significant" that Borer was appointed to an 
endowed chair? What is the evidence to support the suggestion 
about the motives of NIH? Do we really want to adopt the 
Times-Sullivan1" rule for protecting the whistle-blower? Why is 
scientific fraud more reprehensible when financed with federal 
funds? I do not find sufficient, and in some cases, any reasons 
given for these comments or suggestions. 
Langenberg: Federal Funding of University Research 
This report of the committee formed cooperatively by the ma-
jor higher education associations in the United States focuses on 
perhaps the most important long-range problem confronting this 
nation's research effort-how to control the federal funding of 
research activities of nonprofit organizations, largely but not 
solely, educational institutions. Certainly for research oriented 
universities, and, in the long run for the nation as a whole, there 
simply is no more important problem than making sure in some 
way that vital research efforts be continued-and this cannot be 
12. Green, Scientific Responsibility and the Law, 20 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 1009, 1026 
(1987). 
13. Id. at 4. This test was suggested by Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
14. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In order for a pub-
lic official to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood, she must show that the state-
ment was made with " 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 
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done without adequate funding. How to provide the funding is 
just as important as the amount. This report deals with the 
former. 
Some rather esoteric legal, even constitutional questions might 
be raised111 with respect to funding criteria and procedures but 
they do not have any significant impact on the basic issue of 
how to choose which institutions get available funds. That issue 
is in the final analysis a political one. That fact is explicitly rec-
ognized in the report. Assuming the validity of that assumption, 
the legal system has very little to contribute except to help draft 
statutory language expressing the value judgments of Congress 
and the executive branch. 
The one very significant consequence of depending on federal 
funding for most of the research dollars in this country is only 
vaguely referred to in the Committee's report. Whoever pays the 
piper controls the choice of tunes. With certain exceptions aris-
ing from the first and fifth amendments to the Constitution, 
Congress can place almost any conditions on institutions using 
the federal money. If nothing else, Congress can refuse to pro-
vide any funds the next year, even if there are some possible 
freedom of speech and equal protection restrictions on its con-
gressional power once it makes an appropriation. 16 This means 
that research institutions may have to conform to some policies 
they find unwelcome, if they want essential federal research 
funds. 17 
Murray: The Human Body as Property 
Professor Murray's Article deals with a fascinating problem of 
using one person's body parts to help another person stay alive 
or to make possible sophisticated research into the basic func-
tioning of the human body. This has become a significant moral 
and legal problem only in comparatively recent times and only 
15. This is not the place to develop these theories but there surely are some individ-
ual liberties that the government cannot affect, even in the form of withholding benefits. 
See Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in 
Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3 (1984), just for starters. 
16. The abortion funding decisions of the Supreme Court are good examples of deci-
sions supporting this conclusion. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 
432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
17. A recent congressional enactment overruling an earlier Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of prior Title VII statutory language emphasizes the power Congress has through 
placing conditions on use of federal money. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
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because of remarkable advances in biotechnology. Here we have 
an almost perfect example of moral, ethical, and, ultimately, le-
gal problems being created by advances resulting from scientific 
research. The Article presents several dramatic examples of ac-
tivity that clearly present the human values balancing question 
of whether or not to treat the human body as property or as 
something sacrosanct. Recent developments in the use of fetal 
tissue to treat certain brain diseases or malfunctions present the 
problem in most dramatic fashion. 18 
Murray is completely honest in presenting the principal ideas 
and their proponents that address this emotional issue. He is ad-
mirably "fair" in presenting the issue. For anyone wishing to be 
informed of the arguments pro and con in relatively concise 
form, this Article is "must" reading. I came away, however, with 
a feeling of being unsatisfied with the final conclusions he 
reaches and yet I have difficulty identifying specific reasons for 
that feeling. 
Were it my task to write an Article on this subject, I would 
feel obligated to not only raise questions but also articulate my 
own conclusions and my reasons for reaching them. Instead, I 
will only suggest here some of my concerns about accepting the 
author's conclusions without including my own analysis. 
I have serious doubts about accepting the philosophy or theol-
ogy of proponents or opponents of more or less absolutist views. 
Basing answers to specific circumstances or cases on a general 
theory of the nature of the human body and the human mind 
seems to me much too theoretical and unrealistic. It smacks of 
"pigeon-hole jurisprudence" to which I object strenuously. I 
think we should, and in fact are forced by common sense, to 
draw lines and distinctions between different cases. I have seri-
ous doubts about treating the donation or sale of human hair as 
involving the same moral and ethical concerns that the donation 
of a kidney does. Taking a heart or liver from someone who has 
just been declared brain-dead is also a different question it 
seems to me. Surely we will make some distinctions rather than 
consider all transfers of body parts the same way. At least I 
know I would, although I am not clear yet as to what distinc-
tions I would make. The absolutist approach is too simplistic. 
At the end of the Article, Murray states that he would draw a 
basic distinction between transfers of body parts by contract 
and by gift. This also seems too generalized an answer. We have 
so many examples of what amounts to some kind of selling of 
18. Fetus Furor, TIME, Apr. 25, 1988, at 80. 
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the human body in today's world that we need to consider what 
legal distinctions we should make. The world of professional 
sports is one example of the selling of the physical body for the 
entertainment of others. Further, when workers agree to perform 
dangerous tasks, we know that, statistically speaking, some of 
those bodies will become corpses in the natural course of em-
ployment. Before deciding where to draw the line, if at all, be-
tween contract and gift transfers of body parts, we need to rec-
ognize possibly analogous situations and analyze whether or not 
different rules should be applied. 
Professor Murray has made a valuable contribution to the 
analysis of this most difficult and extremely emotional problem, 
but a great deal more thought must be given to the problem 
before we are ready to lay down legal rules. 
McGarity: Agricultural Biotechnologies 
Professor McGarity's Article is a beautiful case study of just . 
how difficult it is to create a viable regulatory scheme that cor-
rectly balances the benefits of scientific advances against the 
possible harms that could arise from making everyday use of the 
new technology. His subject is the use of "recombinant DNA" 
techniques for agricultural purposes throughout the production 
and distribution chain. This use presents almost the classic ex-
ample of cost-benefit analysis in which the benefits are fairly ob-
vious but the costs are only feared or suspected, not known. The 
assessment of risks becomes exceedingly difficult in this situa-
tion. It is difficult to evaluate the unknown! 
As McGarity suggests, one of the greatest potential benefits of 
the use of agricultural biotechnologies is to eliminate the envi-
ronmental hazards that have been created by widespread uses of 
chemical pesticides and fertilizers. There are potential hazards, 
however. McGarity critically analyzes the efforts of the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a satisfactory regulatory 
scheme for use of these new technologies resulting from scien-
tific research. He concludes that the proposed regulatory scheme 
is inadequate, perhaps so much so that Congress may have to 
enact new legislation. His analysis and suggestions are "must" 
reading for those in the USDA, the EPA, and Congress. In addi-
tion, all those concerned with the process of administrative regu-
lation should also put this Article on the "must" reading list. 
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Each reader will have to make a judgment concerning the va-
lidity of the author's detailed suggestions for changes and addi-
tions to the present regulatory scheme for use of genetic agricul-
tural biotechnology, so I will not attempt to do so here. I do 
have some overall doubts or concerns, however, that probably 
should be kept in mind in deciding if, how, and how much regu-
lation should be imposed. 
The author cites some specific examples of new technologies, 
such as pesticides and nuclear power, which have not been com-
pletely benign, and seems to suggest these are particularly bad 
environmentally. I have not studied the pesticide problem but I 
do know a great deal about nuclear power and the regulation of 
that industry. Choosing this technology as the environmental 
whipping boy,19 if that was McGarity's intent, is rather mis-
guided, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl notwithstanding. This 
is not the place to take part, on either side, in the "war" on 
nuclear power. I mean only to cite this as an example of how we 
often take a much too narrow and immediate impact stance in 
evaluating competing costs and benefits. 
In the first place, the nuclear industry has been more compre-
hensively (not necessarily more competently) regulated than any 
industry in the history of the United States. We also knew more 
about its potential hazards from the beginning than we ever 
have about any major industry. Secondly, critics largely have ig-
nored the basic issues of how much power we need in this coun-
try and the world to maintain an acceptable standard of living, 
and what is the lesser or least environmentally hazardous source 
of the necessary power. We are openly concerned about acid rain 
and air pollution caused by fossil fuel generated power. Seldom, 
however, are we informed about how much illness and how many 
deaths are caused by the discharge from fossil fuel power plants. 
We are more likely to know how many fish or snail darters die. 20 
Additionally, we seldom see emphasized in the media how many 
workers are killed each year in drilling for oil or digging for coal, 
or transporting the product to the ultimate market place.21 
19. McGarity, Federal Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnologies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 1089, 1101 (1987). 
20. See Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm 
and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805 (1986). 
21. We know that a fair number are killed each year, such as in the recent death of 
12 of 13 workers and two pilots as their helicopter landed on an offshore oil rig. And this 
was only one accident. 14 Killed as a Helicopter Crashes Onto Oil Rig Off Louisiana 
Coast, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1987, at D23, col. 2. 
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Clearly, over a period of decades, the figure is higher than that 
for producing nuclear generated power. 
I mean here only to suggest that when evaluating the possible 
environmental impact of any new technology, we squarely face 
and decide some basic value conflicts. We should choose the one 
that will do less damage overall in the long run, not the one that 
will do no damage. In the modern world there are not many of 
those activities. We have to face the basic question of what stan-
dard of living we want and what price in the form of damage, to 
people, plants, and animals, we are willing to pay. Approached 
from the opposite end, how much reduction in our present stan-
dard of living will we accept so we can live in a completely un-
contaminated environment? Caves were not very safe either, 
particularly if we had no weapons to keep beasts at bay and fires 
to keep us warm and to cook our food. Producing these tools 
creates pollution. 
Any consideration of how much and what type of regulation is 
. to be imposed on uses of scientific advances must be approached 
with some basic questions in mind. Vested interests of existing 
industries, the effect on our economy, the impact on exports and 
imports, the restrictions on individual freedom of movement and 
job selection, the number of lives that will be made better or 
saved, the number whose lives will be damaged or lost, just to 
mention some items, must all be weighed and a judgment made 
on as rational a basis as possible. One additional consideration 
should be kept in mind when determining how restrictively we 
regulate a new technology. We already live "pretty high off the 
hog," so we can afford to be conservative in using new, poten-
tially hazardous scientific developments. 
Certainly McGarity is correct in arguing that the tort system 
is not a very desirable way of regulating environmental damages. 
The important goal is to prevent as many injuries and deaths as 
possible, not close the barn door after the loss has occurred. 
Even when losses do occur in spite of preventive regulation, new 
technologies create-difficult proof of causal connection problems, 
as McGarity points out. 22 We should change the tort system to 
more realistically reflect the scientific "facts." 
In considering what type of regulation to impose on the appli-
cation of a new technology, another almost intractable problem 
arises; i.e., how to man the regulatory agency. Where do we find 
the competent experts in sufficient numbers to handle ade-
quately the regulatory task fairly and efficiently? I have long 
22. McGarity, supra note 19, at 1101; see also Estep, supra note 3, at 278. 
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suspected that we defeat ourselves by placing responsibility for 
developing and supporting uses of new technologies in one 
agency and delegating to a different agency the task of regulat-
ing such uses, as we have with energy and the environment. If 
we are to make balancing judgments, then we cannot have two 
groups using two different scales and duplicating scarce scien-
tific personnel. Even more important, and as McGarity points 
out, it is hard to get the best and most creative minds to work in 
the regulatory agencies. Other things being equal, we probably 
could attract better people if agency employees could participate 
in both technology development and regulation. Such a setup 
would not only force administrators to recognize the impact of 
one aspect on the other, but also would provide the administra-
tors a chance to work on the frontiers of scientific research and 
consult with others doing closely related work. If we continue to 
think separation is the better solution, and McGarity thinks so, 
then we have to make the pay and professional status high 
enough to attract some of the top people in a particular area. 
Leaving the competent personnel question aside, in the final 
analysis, I maintain that somebody, the Oval Office or Congress 
if nobody else, must make the final balancing judgment. It can-
not be given to two separate groups. Perhaps the use of expert 
advisory groups made up of people in the various research insti-
tutions throughout the country, working on a per diem basis, is 
as good a compromise as we can find to meet the personnel 
problem. This, however, does not answer the problem of finding 
a single agency or official with authority to make the final cost-
benefit judgment. 
Professor McGarity makes several suggestions about permit-
ting "public participation" in regulatory proceedings when pub-
lic safety is at risk. There is much to be said for requiring notice 
of proposed actions and scheduled hearings. Nevertheless, I am 
not at all convinced this problem has been adequately ad-
dressed, although it is frequently discussed in scholarly arti-
cles.23 McGarity makes no extensive case for direct participation 
as a party in the regulatory process; he simply assumes the va-
lidity of this approach. There are gains and losses from such 
participation, not the least of which losses is delay, often with-
out any gain in agency deliberations or public safety. Distinc-
tions probably should be drawn between various types of hear-
ings and even subject matters. 
23. McGarity, supra note 19, at 1108. 
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The question of public participation should be addressed care-
fully and the answer should not be assumed. In our large and 
complex society, we cannot avoid commitment to a representa-
tive form of democracy rather than the old town meeting form 
of government. It does not seem feasible to require a popular 
vote of the public on every question of policy that arises to the 
level of official attention and possible action. By the same token, 
it is not realistic to say that every registered voter in the United 
States has a right to not only intervene but act as prosecutor in 
every administrative regulatory hearing. Surely it is impossible 
to put every decision up for popular vote or even to let every 
voter participate in administrative hearings. These concerns 
must be addressed in deciding who can participate in such hear-
ings and in what role. 
Judicial Nonscience 
The problems raised by the interface between scientific re-
search and the legal system are not limited to the legislative and 
administrative branches of government. As suggested earlier, I 
think many times the judiciary, including the United States Su-
preme Court, handles these problems most inappropriately. Al-
though none of the Articles directs attention specifically to judi-
cial treatment, it is appropriate to cite at least a few examples of 
judicial mistreatment of scientific material. It is important when 
considering the general problem to recognize just how badly this 
third branch of the legal system often handles these questions. 
In some cases, the long-range effect may not be too important 
because a court can change its mind, or the legislature can cor-
rect the mistake. This, however, is not only inefficient and most 
unfair to the specific litigant, but it also denies the general pub-
lic the right to have good, not bad, law. In addition, correction of 
a scientific mistake is not always that easy. If the judiciary bases 
a constitutional decision on a mistaken scientific "fact" or as-
sumption, the legislature cannot correct the ruling. 
Adelman's Article on patent decisions actually deals with judi-
cial treatment of scientific material. His criticism, however, is 
not directed to erroneous understanding of technical material by 
the United States Supreme Court. Rather he objects to the 
Court's basic policy with respect to the intrinsic worth of a pat-
ent system. This is largely a value judgment call, not a scientific 
knowledge one. The following analysis addresses a different 
problem. 
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Through just a few examples I mean to call attention to cases 
in which the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, either 
misunderstand, or are simply ignorant of scientific concepts, or 
use scientific material to camouflage, consciously or uncon-
sciously, the actual basis for the decision. The analysis is not 
directed at the results reached by the courts. It is concerned 
with the misuse, or even failure to use, relevant scientific 
knowledge. 
There are several examples in the area of biology. Early in this 
century, the Supreme Court, in Buck v. Bell, 2" upheld the right 
of a state to sterilize a woman because "[t]hree generations of 
imbeciles are enough."211 In light of present knowledge of genet-
ics, this was much too simplistic and unsophisticated an analy-
sis. In 1927, however, almost nothing was known about inherited 
traits. Quite aside from the question of whether or not Carrie 
Buck should have been prevented from raising any more chil-
dren, or even the ones she already had, the conclusion should 
not have been based on what little we knew about genetics and 
inherited traits at that time. Economic costs and unsuitable pa-
rental ability might justify the result in the case, but not the 
assumption that her feeblemindedness would be passed on 
genetically. 
Today we might, just might, be able to make a sound determi-
nation on that issue, but not in 1927. In one sense, the Court 
should not be criticized because they were not in a very good 
position to even recognize how little they knew. On the other 
hand, when such a serious invasion of bodily integrity is in-
volved, the Court should have required the state to make a very 
good scientific case, which clearly could not have been made. 
The Court also would have done a better job in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson26 (sterilization of criminals) if it 
had addressed the scientific validity of the legislature's assump-
tions about the inheritability of personality traits, as Chief Jus-
tice Stone suggested in his concurrence.27 
Equally unscientific is the Court's approach in the abortion 
cases.28 As Justice O'Connor has pointed out,29 the Court's use 
of "viability" created a "slippery slope" because of constant 
24. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
25. Id. at 207. 
26. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
27. Id. at 545. 
28. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
29. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 454-58 
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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changes in medical capabilities. Equally important, the pregnant 
woman cannot determine beforehand when her "privacy" right 
ends because viability cannot be determined until the fetus is 
delivered. At that point it is too late to decide whether or not 
she can safely ignore the statutory prohibition. Lastly, the tri-
mester concept used by the Court simply misunderstands the 
science of pregnancy. There are no magical three or six month 
division lines. The process is a continuum, not sectionalized. 
My guess is that the Court, perhaps unconsciously, actually 
drew the constitutional line where the fetus looked like a com-
plete and recognizable human being, although admittedly not 
fully developed in some respects and also not yet a constitu-
tional "person." If this is an accurate guess, then the Court 
should state it and explain their reasons for choosing this point 
rather than some other one earlier or later within the pregnancy 
period. I am not arguing the validity of the result, only the mis-
use or misunderstanding of science. 
A classic example of lack of understanding is found in the area 
of economics (I am defining science broadly). One of the most 
perplexing problems the Court has faced over the years is that of 
state taxation of interstate commerce. The basic theory is rela-
tively simple, but application to specific taxes often is terribly 
difficult. The theory is that interstate business should pay a fair 
share of the costs of running state governments but not pay 
multiple taxes because they are doing business in more than one 
state. One line of cases, however, simply flies in the face of eco-
nomic reality and logic. 
Over the years the Court has clearly condemned gross receipt 
taxes unless they are fairly apportioned so as to tax roughly the 
part of the whole transaction that is carried on in the taxing 
state. 30 Various formulas adopted by different states have been 
approved, but the basic requirement. is fair apportionment. 
When it comes to sales taxes, however, the Court has used a lo-
cal incidence theory.31 Leaving aside the difficulties of determin-
ing where the sale takes place (e.g., where the title passes), the 
state in which it does take place can levy the tax because, by 
definition, it cannot happen in any other state and thus, abraca-
dabra, there can be no multiple taxation. What baloney! 
The sales tax is on the dollar amount that the ultimate pur-
chaser pays. Economically speaking, this figure represents every-
thing that went into that final value. It includes the cost of ob-
30. See language in Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
31. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 43 (1940). 
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taining raw material, of processing and shipping the goods, as 
well as the cost of making the local sale. It should not take a 
trained economist to recognize that this is precisely what the 
gross receipt figure represents. Why must one be apportioned 
and the other not? Surely the difference in name should not 
control. Yet the rules have been on the Supreme Court books for 
decades. 
Equally suspect is the economic analysis found in state sever-
ance taxation32 and taxation of foreign commerce.33 At least 
equally unrealistic is its handling of the economics of taxation 
of, 34 and financial aid to religion. 311 Lousy economics must be 
camouflaging the real reasons for the results reached. If some 
compromise with respect to the establishment clause is neces-
sary then the Court should be willing to state that as its reason. 
I again am not arguing about the correctness of the result, only 
the use of bad economic analysis. 
The social sciences have fared no better. The Court's struggle 
over the last two decades with pornography certainly is not 
based on any valid social behavior analysis. It seems to be based 
purely on a hunch, not on scientific research as to social behav-
ior and a causal connection to obscenity.36 Perhaps it is an emo-
tional inheritance from our Puritan founders or even what psy-
chologists and psychiatrists term "projection." 
32. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
33. See Container Corp. of Arn. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Japan 
Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
34. Walz v. Tax Cornrn'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
35. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); 
see also w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1028-
86 (6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter W. LOCKHART). 
36. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 61 (1987); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY & POR-
NOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 32 (1970). 
Recognizing that the publication, Penthouse, has a built-in bias, the two stories by 
Nobile and Nadler on the composition, the method of operation, and the report of the 
recent Attorney General's Commission nevertheless do paint a devastating picture of a 
lack of appreciation of what goes into a scientifically valid sociological and psychological 
study. As they report, the only trained scientist on the Commission wrote a strong dis-
sent to the Commission report, and was joined by the other woman on the Commission, 
the editor of Woman's Day. Nobile & Nadler, Ed Meese Giues Bad Commission, PENT-
HOUSE, July 1986, at 50; Nadler & Nobile, Lynching Pornography, PENTHOUSE, Aug. 1986, 
at 72 (articles on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). In a similar vein is an article by Dersho-
witz, A 20th Century Inquisition, PENTHOUSE, July 1986, at 107 (article on file with U. 
MICH. J.L. REF.). Scheer, Inside the Meese Commission, PLAYBOY, Aug. 1987, at 60 (arti-
cle on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.), if his reporting of the activities of the Commission is 
even remotely accurate, makes a persuasive case for the proposition that most members 
of the Commission lacked both knowledge and any interest in a scientifically valid ap-
proach to the obscenity problem. 
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Many examples of judicial assumptions of questionable scien-
tific validity can be found in our rules governing legal proceed-
ings such as criminal and civil trials. One aspect of the exclu-
sionary rule illustrates the lack of scientific sophistication on the 
part of the Court. It found that the use of an accepted medical 
procedure in the form of a stomach pump was "shocking" and 
"brutal" but the use of another medical procedure, drawing 
blood samples, was "reasonable."37 It referred to no evidence 
showing the relative safety and painfulness of the two 
procedures. 
Actually there is no scientific basis for the underlying theory 
of the exclusionary rule; i.e., that illegal police actions will be 
deterred. Speaking off the top of my head, as apparently the Su-
preme Court did, and based on "common knowledge," I strongly 
suspect their assumption is invalid. I am not arguing the merits 
of the exclusionary rule, only the scientific (?) basis for the 
Court's assumption. Other arguments besides deterrence might 
be suggested,38 but that is a different question. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Symposium addresses one of the major problems that the 
legal system must face in today's technological world. Arguably, 
the credibility of our system in the eyes of other professionals 
and probably even the general public is at stake. The examples 
given are only a few of the many that demonstrate a lack of sen-
sitivity and knowledge about scientific research that exists in 
our profession. We simply are not doing an adequate job. 
The Articles in this Symposium do demonstrate that some 
lawyers and political representatives are aware of the tremen-
dous impact science and technology have on our society. We 
need much more effort, however, and many more people working 
on the problems of assimilating scientific discoveries. Blame 
must be shared by all parts of the legal system-legislators, ad-
ministrators, and lawyers. Practicing lawyers and legal academ-
ics certainly must share a good deal of the blame for the short-
comings of the whole profession. If this Symposium helps 
sensitize us, it will have made an important contribution to 
37. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) with Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
38. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (discussing other rationales, in addition to 
deterrence, for adopting the exclusionary rule). 
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achieving more sensible and more nearly fair results from our 
legal system. We must not settle for a merely definite result, 
right or wrong. 
Trial and reviewing courts must insist on hearings that pro-
duce a decent, scientifically sophisticated record. Assumptions 
and common sense too often are inconsistent with known scien-
tific findings and theories. Practicing lawyers must accept re-
sponsibility for informing legislators, administrators, and judi-
cial decisionmakers of pertinent scientific material. More must 
be done than the creation of scientific courts, as some have 
suggested. 39 
One of the most challenging problems in making intelligent 
use of scientific material is, in some way, to find support for the 
legal-scientific research that is needed to test our assumptions 
against scientific knowledge. An initial problem is how to con-
duct this research to test various options without violating our 
obligation of giving equal treatment to litigants who are in es-
sentially the same situation;'0 
Assuming we solve the fairness problem, the financing of such 
research is at least as difficult. The organized bar will have to 
convince the legislators of the dire need for funding. Probably 
most of the funding will have to come from Congress because 
most scientific research does not vary from state to state. Cer-
tainly it will be difficult to find the necessary scientific staff, but 
adequate staff cannot carry out valid work without adequate fi-
nancing. We have an obligation to seek the necessary support! 
One caution should be expressed. As the recent United States 
Supreme Court decision, McClesky u. Kemp,-n clearly demon-
39. My objection to a science court is two-fold. I do not believe that any single group 
of people can become expert enough in a sufficient number of areas of science and tech-
nology to deal fairly with the scientific issues that will arise in the great variety of cases 
that come to the courts for decision. Using separate expert advisors in special areas 
would be more realistic. In addition, most cases involve human value judgments, not just 
science, and skill in handling these factors probably is developed better in dealing with a 
greatly varying number of subject matters. 
40. See W. LOCKHART, supra note 35, at 447-54 (citing cases). Our treatment, for ex-
ample, of the question of retroactivity of decisions in criminal procedural due process 
cases illustrate how sticky this problem can become. 
· 41. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). In that case, a black man was convicted of killing a white 
police officer during the course of a robbery. He was sentenced to death by a Georgia 
court and sought review by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that a scien-
tific study of Georgia death penalty cases for six years during the 1970's (the Baldus 
study) showed racial discrimination in imposing the death penalty when a black person 
killed a white victim. He asserted that the imposition of the penalty in his case, there-
fore, violated the eighth amendment and hence the fourteenth. 
The case is a beautiful example of the relevancy of scientific research results in decid-
ing a legal question and of the great difficulties involved in making proper use of such 
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strates, being aware of scientific research and being willing to 
analyze its relevance for a particular case is only the beginning. 
In the final analysis, legal decisions of all sorts involve value 
judgments and these usually are not answered by science. I am 
only suggesting here that these essential value judgments be 
based upon an intelligent understanding of scientific concepts. 
Legal rulings should at least be scientifically sound, and even 
this often is an extremely complex task. The great difficulty 
found in making value judgments, however, is no excuse for us-
ing bad science. 
material. In this case, the majority and most of the dissenting justices could not avoid 
analyzing the significance of the scientific research. 
The members of the majority were willing to assume that the Baldus study was statis-
tically valid, id. at 1766 n. 7, and showed that there was a "discrepancy that appears to 
correlate with race." Id. at 1777. They held, however, that the study did not "prove" 
racial bias in all capital cases or in McCleskey's particular case. Id. at 1775. The majority 
was also unwilling to hold that the risk of such bias was sufficient to justify invalidating 
the death sentence in Georgia. Id. at 1778. Justice Powell, for the Court, then gave sev-
eral nonscientific reasons why the majority could not invalidate the death sentence pro-
cedure in Georgia. Id. at 1778-81. 
Justice Brennan, in dissent for four justices, found the scientific study sufficient to 
support McCleskey's argument. He emphasized the fairly startling figures showing a gen-
eral correlation between race and imposition of the death sentence. He concluded that 
the "evidence shows that there is better than an eve·n chance in Georgia that race will 
influence the decision to impose the death penalty." Id. at 1785. He also asserted that 
"Georgia's legacy of a race-conscious criminal justice system" supported the Baldus 
study's results. He was unimpressed with the other reasons given by the majority. 
Both majority and dissenting justices did directly face the scientific study evidence. 
The majority, however, did not adequately address the intriguing question of why statis-
tical evidence of racial bias should be used in deciding the constitutionality of selecting 
juries but not in the imposition of a sentence. Likewise, no real guidelines are given in 
any of the opinions to determine when statistical evidence is sufficiently persuasive to 
"prove" bias in institutional actions. The majority's position would seem to reject almost 
all use of statistical analysis and the dissent does not really indicate what percentage of 
correlation will be sufficient to prove bias. In addition, the dissent's position would seem 
to dictate that, at the present time, almost no blacks could be brought to trial, at least 
for murder, because they say the statistics establish the presence of racial bias in Georgia 
trials generally. The only possible solution to the dissent's dilemma would seem to be to 
have all blacks tried only by an all black tribunal, i.e., judge, prosecutor, and jury. Surely 
this is unacceptable. The only solution to the majority's dilemma is equally unpalatable, 
cross-examination of jurors after the verdict is rendered in an effort to determine if ra-
cial bias entered into their vote of "guilty." 
In any event, and regardless of the dilemma, none of the justices seem to recognize the 
nature of statistical correlation evidence. Such evidence will always be in percentages, 
and the Court should face the issue of where to draw the line-at 25%, 51 %, 75%, or 
98%. The dissent's reference to "more probable than not" suggests that perhaps 50% is 
enough but this is at least doubtful. On the other hand, does the majority mean anything 
less than 100% is not sufficient proof? Even "beyond a reasonable doubt" allows some 
margin of error. This question will not go away by ignoring it and it won't be any easier 
in future cases because of the very nature of this scientific material. The Court must face 
this issue, uncomfortable as that may be. 
